

SECRET  
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9 Oct 62  
SAO-T-1359-62-CW

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DIAXX

SUBJECT: Request for Special Downgrading Authority Relating to  
Certain New Significant Installations in Cuba

TO: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

REF: COMOR D-24/11, 6 Apr 62, Subj: Downgrading and Release of  
Cuban Photography

1. Since USIB authorized the downgrading of all TALENT photography acquired on Cuba prior to 1 May 61 (See COMOR D-24/12, 26 Apr 62), a number of new and highly significant military developments have occurred in Cuba. These have included the introduction of SA-2 SAM sites; cruise-type surface-to-surface missile sites; PT boats equipped with short range SSNs; first line fighters (FISHBEDS); and a variety of other Soviet and Bloc military equipment. In addition, a number of new installations have been built or are under construction since 1 May 61, and other installations have undergone major construction changes.
2. An urgent requirement exists to provide key military plans and operational elements with selected photography of these new military complexes at the SECRET level. The current TALENT Sanitization Manual requires that sanitization be accomplished in such a manner as to allow reasonable attribution to collection methods other than U-2. This is a long and time-consuming process which requires many scarce photo technician man-hours, and in addition, a complete altering of scale and format. This procedure does not provide the accurate and timely basic target and planning material now required on Cuba. In addition to the complicated sanitization procedures, there is no reasonable source available to which the photography can be credited.
3. It has also been noted that a number of press releases have been recently made on Cuba via State and White House public information channels relating to the significant new military capabilities recently identified. The basic source of the intelligence reported in these press releases has been TALENT. In addition, non-TALENT cleared recipients of the SECRET/SITSUM on Cuba can certainly deduce with little imagination that the source of the data is overflight photography.

DIA review(s) completed.

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4. In order to provide the key commands concerned with contingency planning on Cuba with the basic intelligence data required, such as air strike folders, AIF, maps, charts, etc., and because of the long lead time required to update and prepare these materials even with SECRET material, it is recommended that COMOR take immediate action to downgrade all photography on Cuba to SECRET, and that the products of all future missions be classified SECRET and not in the TALENT Control System.

5. In the event it is not feasible at the moment to downgrade all past and future material to SECRET, it is then recommended that COMOR take whatever action is necessary to provide selected prints at the SECRET level of all of those newly identified facilities in Cuba which represent a major threat to the successful execution of contingency planning. These installations include:

- a. All major airfields (including those U/C)
- b. Each identified SSN site
- c. Each SA-2 SAM site and support facility
- d. All major ports and naval facilities
- e. Key military installations (including storage)

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Captain, USN  
COMOR Member  
DIA/Joint Staff

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